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Abstract 
In this paper I present an account of musical arousal that takes into account key demands of 
formalist philosophers such as Peter Kivy and Nick Zangwill. Formalists prioritise our 
understanding and appreciation of the music itself. As a result, they demand that any feelings 
we have in response to music must be directed at the music alone, without being distracted by 
non-musical associations. To accommodate these requirements I appeal to a mechanism of 
contagion which I synthesize with the expectation-based arousal mechanism proposed by 
Leonard Meyer. This account connects musical expressivity and arousal in a way that 
formalists have rejected, but I argue that it provides the best explanation of our observations of 
listener responses while also focusing on the music itself. 
 
 
1. The formalist challenge 
To what extent do we feel emotions when listening to purely instrumental music? There are 
numerous psychological experiments indicating that listeners are aroused by a variety of 
emotional states (see e.g. Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008; Higgins, 2012 for reviews). Yet 
psychologists have not been able to rule out the possibility that these emotions are directed at 
non-musical associations that are not properly part of the music itself.  As a result, formalist 
philosophers of music have rejected most apparent emotional responses as inadmissible. 
 
The most prominent formalist philosophers are Peter Kivy and Nick Zangwill. Kivy is best 
known for defending an ‘enhanced formalist’ position. According to this view, music can be 
expressive of garden variety emotions—that is emotions like sadness, fear, and anger—but we 
are never aroused by these emotions, at least when properly engaged with the music alone (e.g. 
1980; 1991; 1999; 2006; 2007). Zangwill meanwhile takes the stronger position that 




What role, then, does emotion play in what music is, and in our experience of 
music? Answer: none of any significance. Emotion is a thorough distraction when 
thinking about the nature of music. 
(Zangwill, 2004, p. 42, cf. also Zangwill, 2007; Zangwill, 2014) 
 
At the same time, formalists admit certain affective responses. For instance, Kivy rejected the 
charge that his experience of music was coldly intellectual: “Anyone who is acquainted with 
me personally, as a listener or musician, knows that quite the opposite is true. I am an emoter 
from way back” (1999, p. 2). Instead, formalists claim, we can be moved by the beauty of the 
music. Potentially, this may be described as a sort of ‘aesthetic emotion’, although its status as 
a genuine emotional state (as opposed to a non-practically oriented pleasure) is uncertain. 
 
So according to the formalist, some affective states are legitimately aroused by the music itself, 
where others are not. Yet the idea that legitimate affective states can only be aroused by an 
appraisal of the beauty (or ugliness) of the music may unnecessarily restrict the range of 
appropriate felt responses. In particular, it may be possible for music to generate arousal in a 
more direct manner, unmediated by appraisals, yet still part and parcel of focused appreciation 
of the music alone. 
 
The approach I take towards musical arousal takes on some key formalist claims. Most 
importantly, I will agree that being moved by music alone does not arouse garden variety 
emotions. Nevertheless, my account is unlikely to fully satisfy the formalists. To explain how 
we are moved by music, I think we must appeal to the contagious mirroring of expressive 
qualities. This account will conflict with Zangwill’s denial that music genuinely resembles 
emotional states. It will also conflict with Kivy’s unequivocal statement that “we will discover 
how music moves only when, first, we disassociate that question from the question of how 
music can be expressive of the garden-variety emotions” (Kivy, 1991, p. 157). 
 
Contagion models are already very popular (e.g. Davies, 1994, pp. 279-307; Carroll, 2003; 
Bharucha, Curtis, and Paroo, 2006; Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008; Young, 2014, pp. 61-63). Thus 
the basic mechanism of arousal that I endorse is not especially original. However, my model 
will innovatively combine the contagion mechanism with Leonard Meyer’s (1956) 
expectation-based arousal mechanism. This then has a number of further attractions: First, it 
will allow us to incorporate some insights from contemporary emotion theory. Second, it will 
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allow us to make sense of the variety of arousal effects that we observe. Third, it will allow 
that arousal can be part of the proper appreciation of aesthetic qualities, because it can be linked 
with the understanding of musical form. 
 
The paper will proceed as follows: In the following section I will outline some theory-neutral 
desiderata for making sense of our affective responses to music. I will then outline the 
resemblance account of musical expressivity (section 3) which, by means of appeals to 
contemporary emotion theory, I synthesise with Meyer’s expectation mechanism (section 4). 
My account of musical arousal will then follow (section 5) concluding with a comparison to 
some competitor theories (section 6).  
 
2. Desiderata 
When trying to explain how music can move us there are three crucial conditions that we must 
satisfy. The first is the principle that formalists always insist upon: That whatever we feel, it 
must be directed at, or be about the music. It is this principle that leads the formalist to deny 
that musical arousal can legitimately involve the recall of conventional or personal associations, 
or the visualisation of accompanying scenarios. Of course, the average listening experience is 
often filled with such things, but when it is we are distracted from the music itself. This is not 
a point unique to contemporary philosophers like Kivy or Zangwill. Hanslick is well-known 
for defending this point (1854/1986), and it can traced even further back to Schopenhauer 
(1819/1907). 
 
The second condition for an account of musical arousal is to acknowledge that while legitimate 
feelings in response to music may broadly be said to be directed towards the aesthetic qualities 
of the music, they clearly come in different types. As Kivy puts it,  
 
The feeling of musical excitement one gets in contemplating the beautiful 
melancholy of this music of Beethoven’s is very different from the feeling of 
musical excitement one gets in contemplating the beautiful way in which Bach 
sneaks in the final return of the subject of the A-flat Fugue in the Well-Tempered 
Clavier, Book II, into the tenor voice, so that its fall to the major third makes the 
final cadence. 




Kivy’s own answer to this requirement is to lean more heavily on the intentional content of the 
mental state (e.g. 1999, p. 9-10). He claims that the kind of feeling is to be characterised by the 
fact that it is directed at music with its specific expressive content. Appealing to the intentional 
object for differentiation is a strategy we also find in Martha Nussbaum’s cognitivist theory of 
emotions (2004). However, this approach is less likely to be endorsed by non-cognitivists such 
as Jesse Prinz (2004) or Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni (2012), for whom the distinct 
qualities of emotions are bound up more closely with bodily feelings. 
 
This leads us to a related third condition for an account of musical arousal, which is to explain 
why people physiologically and behaviourally respond in a variety of ways when listening to 
music. Kivy and Zangwill do not give this point sufficient due in their writings but it is clear 
that we witness people smiling, frowning, sighing, shedding tears, jumping up and down, 
gripping the arms of their seats, as the case may be. Another striking response to music is the 
feeling of chills or shivers down the spine (e.g. Blood and Zatorre, 2001). Note that this 
response, while distinctive, is not unique to music. One may well experience chills if, for 
instance, one is sitting in a large audience and one’s name is unexpectedly called out (e.g. 
perhaps to receive a prize, or a scolding). The standard biological explanation for chills appeals 
to the piloerection response, regarded as a hangover of a threat response in hairy animals that 
allows them to look larger.  
 
These responses look suspiciously like the responses that are part of, or caused by different 
garden-variety emotions. As such, they threaten the traditional formalist position. Yet it has 
been suggested to me that a formalist may exclude listeners’ observable responses on the 
grounds that they would violate a Kantian account of aesthetic appreciation.1 A commitment 
to Kant cannot be a theory-neutral desideratum on accounts of musical arousal. Nevertheless, 
I do not believe that admitting physiological or behavioural responses automatically violates it. 
First, if the worry is that aesthetic responses must show subjective universality, and listeners’ 
responses are too varying, then we can restrict the range of musical responses only to normal 
responses that don’t show any sensitivity to individual factors. This seems to leave a large 
variety of affective responses to music intact. Second, there is nothing about the nature of a 
disinterested pleasure that seems to rule out its accompaniment by a range of physiological and 
behavioural responses (see the end of section 5 for more on this latter point). 
                                               




Meanwhile, the more typical response from Kivy and Zangwill is to doubt that the listener is 
properly concentrating on the music alone. For what it’s worth, I can frankly attest to displaying 
all of the above responses while engaging in no personal associations or imagery whatsoever 
(consciously at least). Moreover, I don’t think it is giving the game away to admit that different 
physiological and behavioural responses can be triggered when we are moved by music. A tear 
in the eye does not automatically entail garden-variety sadness. For instance, the psychologist 
Vladimir Konečni (2005) endorses Kivy’s position while treating the different responses as 
indicators of distinct aesthetic emotions. 
 
Let us put it this way: a theory of musical arousal that can accommodate our obvious 
physiological responses while also satisfying the other two conditions is a more robust theory 
than one that must reject these responses as inadmissible. To dismiss normal affective 
responses to music as secretly or unconsciously directed at non-musical factors risks seeming 
ad hoc. 
 
Overall, these conditions: that the feeling is directed at the music (and not distractors), that 
there are different subjective feelings, and different physiological responses, should be agreed 
on all sides as foundational to this debate.  
 
3. Expressive qualities 
I am going to argue that a contagion-like mechanism is our best explanation for musical arousal. 
On this account, musical arousal closely aligns with the musical expressivity of garden-variety 
emotions. Accordingly, a large chunk of this paper must be devoted to musical expressivity. 
While drawing upon existing accounts in this section, I will offer in the following section a 
revised theory that incorporates some contemporary views about emotion phenomenology. 
Following this, a new contagion-based model of musical arousal can be developed fairly 
straightforwardly. 
 
In his first book The Corded Shell (1980), Kivy proposed a resemblance theory of musical 
expressivity. Later in his career, Kivy backed away from this particular account. He came to 
regard pure instrumental music as “a ‘black box’, as regards how [expressive] properties get 
there” (2006, p. 301). However, as James Young observes in his exhaustive critical review of 
Kivy’s theory, Kivy never provided arguments against the resemblance theory, and he did not 
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replace the theory with another (Young, 2014, p. 13). It still stands as the most informative 
theory of the actual techniques by which music is expressive. 
 
The basic idea of resemblance theory is that musical features such as melodic contour, 
instrumental attacks, and rhythmic patterns resemble features of emotional states. Kivy initially 
emphasizes the resemblance between musical features and the contours of emotional 
vocalisations. A parallel resemblance theory developed independently by Stephen Davies 
(1980) emphasises cross-modal resemblances to bodily posture and behaviour. 
 
Consider, for example, the solo violin theme near the beginning of Rimsky-Korsakov’s 
Scheherazade suite. The way the line rises and falls bears some stylistic resemblance to the 
rising and falling intonation of a person’s voice when undergoing emotion, and also to sighing. 
At the same time, Davies would argue that resemblances to wider bodily movement patterns 
can capture more of the detail of these melodic figures, as when a human in the grip of an 
emotion rises or swoons or curls her fingers (2003, p. 176). Yet it is not necessary to demand 
either one sort of resemblance or the other. Bodily and vocal contours do not exclude each 
other and the listener does not have to determine what exactly the contours resemble to get an 
intuitive sense of the way an emotion appears.  
 
Indeed, we should add to the range of emotional resemblances. Some defenders of resemblance 
theory emphasise resemblances with the inner phenomenology of emotions. For instance, in 
previous work I have appealed to resemblances between the sensory roughness of timbre and 
harmony, and the sensations of tension experienced in emotion (Cochrane, 2010, pp. 201-202). 
Jenefer Robinson (2005, pp. 311-312) and Malcolm Budd (1995, p. 207) also refer to 
resemblances between the dynamics of musical change and the dynamics of thought processes 
stimulated during emotional episodes. 
 
Thus, sticking with our example of Scheherazade, the exquisite timbre of the solo violin 
resembles an inner feeling of almost languorous smoothness. The phrase structure of the 
melody can also capture certain thought dynamics, where some phrases have a tumbling 
forwards quality whether others have a more settled feel. 
 
Overall I think we should combine inner feeling resemblances with external appearance 
resemblances. If we are appealing to cross-modal resemblances anyway, and moreover 
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resemblances to emotional features that are not actually directly in front the listener while they 
listen to the music, the restriction to outward appearances seems ad hoc. We connect the sound 
of movement as much with the feeling of movement as its visual appearance. Indeed, 
philosophers working in the phenomenological tradition have long emphasised that vocal and 
behavioural expressions of emotion equally give us an impression of the subjective 
phenomenology of emotional experience (for a review see Krueger, 2014). So even if we are 
discerning resemblances to the outward appearances of emotions, these are quickly linked to 
inner feelings. All roads lead to Rome. 
 
The crucial supporting point, widely acknowledged by all those who believe in the expressive 
powers of music, is that the music itself seems to possess the emotional quality (Kivy declares 
a consensus on this point 1999, p. 1). Moreover, it is not simply that music vaguely reminds us 
of emotions. Musical works convey the most vivid sense of what emotions are like as they 
unfold over time, with different works, and even different performances of those works 
conveying different shades and subtle nuances of emotion. Accordingly, it is plausible that 
music makes us think of emotions in virtue of getting us to think of the inner phenomenology 
of emotional experience.  
 
In fact, the expressive power of instrumental music is so vivid that it functions reciprocally as 
a constraint on theories of emotional experience. Pure instrumental music, lacking the 
presentation of situational propositions, can powerfully express what an emotion is like to 
listeners who honestly aver to not thinking of such propositions. This entails that a major part 
of the phenomenology of emotion must be constituted by features of our mental lives that 
instrumental music can plausibly capture, i.e. non-propositional features. This is still fairly 
broad since it includes all those features mentioned above: vocal and bodily contours, tactile 
feelings, and thought dynamics. Nevertheless, it is important succour to those defending 
feeling-based theories of emotion. 
 
4. Bodily feelings 
Resemblances to the subjective feelings of emotion are a good start, but we can go a lot further. 
By drawing on some insights from contemporary theories of emotional experience, we can 
incorporate another major approach into our theories of musical expressivity: Leonard Meyer’s 
expectation-based theory of musical understanding (1956). If this works, it’s quite an exciting 




In recent years, philosophers of emotion have paid closer attention to the details of bodily 
experience. These analyses tend to be tied to non-cognitive theories of emotions, however it is 
possible to draw on them without buying into the non-cognitive theory. The key insight is that 
patterns of bodily responses, without association with propositionally construed situations, can 
convey intentional content. 
 
An initial step is Jesse Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotions (2004), which proposed that 
bodily feelings represent the formal objects of emotional states. For instance, the pattern of 
bodily feelings characteristic of fear represents the dangerousness of the situation. Later 
philosophers, while rejecting Prinz’s comparison with perception, held onto the claim that 
bodily feelings bear content that goes beyond the simple interoception of the condition of the 
body. In particular, while Prinz tends to treat feeling patterns as merely symbolic, later 
philosophers have analysed how the precise character of the feelings contributes to its 
meaningful content. 
 
Thus Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni propose that patterns of bodily feeling reflect the action 
tendencies that emotions automatically trigger for the sake of managing the situation (even if 
we don’t end up acting them out). It is in virtue of recognising the characteristics of the action 
tendencies that we experience ourselves as oriented towards the world in a certain way: 
 
We feel a bodily attitude towards a given object, which amounts to saying that we 
feel the way our body is geared towards the object we are facing. The body is felt 
in the form of a gestalt of bodily sensations, which consists in being ready to 
respond in a given way to the object. 
(Deonna and Teroni, 2012, p. 87) 
 
Note that the bodily responses (e.g. heart thumping, muscles tension) in themselves are not 
representing the action tendency. The felt content requires the subject to form a gestalt; to 
understand how they are being pulled to respond. The subject grasps the pattern of responses 




Another philosopher who develops this theme is Rebekka Hufendiek (2016) who regards the 
feelings of the body as a sense of action affordances. Here for instance she analyses the 
characteristic feelings of bodily tension in anger: 
 
Anger represents restrictions or, rather, restrictions-to-be-fought. What the 
affordance concept adds to this view is that the content of an actual anger 
representation is constituted by the arousal and the sensorimotor reactions that 
prepare the organism for a fight. 
(Hufendiek, 2016, p. 163) 
 
In my own work on emotions I have similarly followed this theme. I argue that, while cognitive 
appraisals are required to trigger a bodily response, the response is then felt, adding an extra 
layer of intentional content to the overall emotional experience. Like Hufendiek and Deonna 
and Teroni, I analyse these patterns of bodily feelings as feelings of the person being actively 
disposed towards the world in a certain kind of way. I also develop the phenomenology in 
relational terms, suggesting that the feeling of one’s bodily disposition is simultaneously a 
feeling of ‘emotional space’: 
 
One may feel that something heavy is weighing one down or that one is floating 
in thin air. In this way, the sense of emotional space is one in which certain actions 
seem encouraged. For instance, when we feel joy, the emotional space seems 
bright, boundless, even springy. We may then manifest this sense of emotional 
space by actually running, jumping or dancing around, or we may more generally 
interact with the actual environment in an energetic or springy manner. 
(Cochrane, 2018. p. 102) 
 
In terms of making sense of musical expressivity, the main point to draw from these discussions 
is that the experience of bodily responses is sufficient to convey distinct emotional meaning. 
Therefore, if we discern resemblances to bodily responses when listening to music, this suffices 
for an experience of music as conveying distinct emotional meaning. We do not need to import 
additional thoughts about propositionally construed situations (i.e. images or text).  
 
Indeed, I claim that the formal qualities of music literally bear some of the same qualities as 
emotional bodily feelings. For example, a pattern of bodily activity in which one feels one’s 
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heart pattering, combined with a softness in the limbs and a slow heaving of the chest may 
convey a sense of melancholy yearning. The violin solo from Scheherazade equally conveys 
the melancholy sense of yearning by means of its rising sequences combined with its smooth 
timbre and the way its phrases tend to fall at the end. There are high level properties that both 
patterns share. For instance, they both display rising activity, and mild conflict between the 
rising activity and the falling motion. 
 
Formalists such as Zangwill may well object here that the music isn’t literally yearning here 
the way that the feelings are yearning. But note that bodily feelings aren’t literally yearning 
either. In themselves, they are patterns of pressure and movement sensation, and it is because 
the individual understands their connection with behavioural activity that he or she takes them 
to represent yearning content. Equally then, musical works don’t need to be literally yearning 
to convey emotional meaning. They only have to share properties with the felt representation 
of yearning to legitimize our making a systematic association with behavioural activity when 
we hear them.2 
 
In addition to underlining the ambitions of resemblance theory, contemporary theories of 
emotion also help us to recognize that an emotional bodily feeling is not merely a static 
representation of how things currently stand. It is a sense of how things are changing in time; 
a response trajectory. As such, if the music listener discerns emotional bodily feelings in the 
music, this can equally be analysed as discerning a response trajectory. 
 
Making this connection between bodily feelings and action dispositions is what allows us to 
incorporate Leonard Meyer’s expectation-based theory of musical understanding into our 
model. Meyer argued that based upon our prior experiences of music, at every moment of 
musical listening we anticipate how the music is likely to develop. These expectations can be 
satisfied, subverted, or delayed (as when a cadence is drawn out). By forming expectations that 
are satisfied or not, we feel patterns of tension and release. These patterns alert us to the formal 
qualities of the music. Thus “while the trained musician consciously waits for the expected 
                                               
2 If this was a paper about musical expressivity I would have to offer a lot more. For instance, I haven’t discussed 
the mechanics of cross-modal association or given much detail about how different musical variables resemble 
emotional features. Since this essay is focused on musical arousal however, I am content to refer the reader to 
other authors who discuss these factors in considerable detail. See Davies (1994); Robinson (2005); Nussbaum 
(2007); Cochrane (2010); Higgins (2012); Young (2014). 
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resolution of a dominant seventh chord the untrained, but practiced, listener feels the delay as 
affect” (1956, p. 40). 
 
Actually Meyer’s points about expectations are also applicable to the experience of bodily 
feelings in regular emotional states. The phenomenology of emotional experience involves not 
just the sense of response potentials. We also track how potentials get played out; whether they 
are satisfied, frustrated, or suddenly redirected. This adds a further dimension to emotional 
experience, whereby we grasp how well our responses are managing to cope with the demands 
placed upon them. For instance, to feel one’s bodily responses suddenly lurch is itself a 
representation of discombobulation. 
 
Putting these points together, my claim is that discerning a certain emotional quality in the 
music involves discerning emotional bodily feelings (on the basis of various resemblances). 
Discerning emotional bodily feelings in the music is a matter of the listener modelling an action 
tendency and this action tendency model is ultimately an expectation about how the target’s 
responses are liable to develop. These expectations can then be confirmed or denied, depending 
on the progress of the music. Thus to discern from a piece of music a sense of what an emotion 
is like can be analysed as forming expectations about the development of certain feelings heard 
in the music. These expectations about feelings are part of what it is to understand the 
progression of the music, as in Meyer’s theory. 
 
Note that Meyer links musical understanding to the listener’s arousal. He says the expectation 
is felt by some listeners as affect. However, I make use of Meyer’s mechanic to explain 
expressivity first, and then apply the account to arousal in the following section. At this stage, 
we need only construe the listener’s expectations as discernments of tension in the music rather 
than felt in the body. 
 
This model is comparable to the way we model another person’s actions tendencies when 
observing them undergo an emotional response. For instance, when we see someone shout and 
clench their fists in rage, we are apt to get a vivid impression of how they feel (even alongside 
our own feelings) and this impression includes the expectation of aggressive behaviour (e.g. 
that they might strike out). As we continue to track their expressive behaviour, our anticipations 




At the same time, making a strong connection between bodily feelings and expectations allows 
us to remedy a defect in Meyer’s theory. While most have agreed that Meyer identified an 
important feature of listening experience, it is hard to turn it in a general theory of musical 
expressivity because patterns of tension and release alone are insufficient to capture the range 
of emotional variations (cf. Kivy, 1991. p. 156). In particular, patterns of tension and release 
are insufficient to capture the valent (i.e. positive or negative) aspects of emotions. Both 
excitement and terror involve a similar sense of tension, and both misery and contentment 
involve a similar sense of release. So by combining the expectation mechanic with the 
immediate resemblance to bodily feelings (e.g. connecting the relative sensory roughness of 
the minor key with discomfort, or loud and fast dynamics with power), the full range of 
emotional qualities can be captured. 
 
Overall this synthesis has two major attractions. First, by linking musical patterns to response 
trajectories we can flesh out how music manages to express what emotions are like, and how 
they convey meaningful content. That is, to hear music as sad is not just to discern connections 
with slow and soft bodily movement, but to hear a response disposition or trajectory indicative 
of despondence and vulnerability. Thus we have a more sophisticated theory of musical 
expressivity. 
 
The second attraction is that we can incorporate the tracking of expressive qualities more 
directly into the process of understanding musical form. That is, forming expectations about 
how the musical form will develop involves forming expectations based on models of action 
tendencies. Linking expressive qualities with the understanding and appreciation of musical 
form is the fundamental point of Kivy’s enhanced formalism. We need not demand that all 
musical understanding demands the translation of musical features into emotional features. 
However, given the generality of the processes described, and the wide range of musical 
features that the resemblance theory links with emotional features, this is a widely applicable 
theory. 
 
So I believe the formalist should embrace the detection of expressive qualities in music. 
However we should address two possible formalist worries here. First, note that our 
expectations of action tendencies are most likely acquired via prior experiences of emotion and 
their behavioural manifestations. Thus background knowledge that goes beyond the musical 
work itself is involved in experiencing music. This is potentially in tension with formalist 
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demands to pay attention only to the music itself. However, the claim is not that we explicitly 
remember prior emotional experiences when listening to music. We have simply acquired 
prototypical models of how emotions work which we intuitively deploy when understanding 
the emotional qualities of the music. The idea that our experience of music is informed by our 
background knowledge is compatible with formalist claims.3 
 
A second related worry is that detecting emotional content in music implies that music is 
merely the medium and our attention is directed at something beyond the music itself. However, 
we can treat the expressive qualities of music as analogous to pictorial representation (cf. 
Young, 2014). That is, it is part of the work itself that it bears this content (typically intended 
as such by the composer). Moreover, any impression of emotional content is intertwined with 
attention towards the musical surface. Music possesses the kind of two-foldness that Richard 
Wollheim (1998) identified in pictorial representation. 
 
5. Musical Arousal 
Where are we so far? I have defended the view that resemblances play a role in our sensitivity 
to the expressive properties of music, and I have argued for the resemblance to bodily feelings 
in particular.4 I have then argued that tracking such resemblances involves generating action 
expectations that fill out the sense of emotional meaning. I also want to emphasise that you 
don’t need to adopt a non-cognitivist model of emotions to accept the model I have proposed. 
In particular, we need not reject the cognitivist view of emotion which states that the appraisal 
of an object comes first, followed by the arousal of bodily responses. We need only add that 
patterns of bodily feeling are also capable of representing emotional meaning such that music 
alone can convey it. 
 
Yet once we accept that patterns of music can capture meaning in the same way of patterns of 
bodily feeling, it is only short step to a view of musical arousal that contradicts Kivy and 
Zangwill. Processing resemblances to bodily feelings very plausibly involves recreating or 
simulating those bodily feelings. Simulating these feelings can in turn lead to more full-blooded 
arousal of these feelings. Note that the claim is that this can happen. I am not claiming that 
                                               
3 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
4 I should note here that despite the necessary causal role played by resemblances, I make no claim that we 
reflectively experience ourselves making resemblance comparisons while hearing expressive properties in music. 
The experiential upshot most compatible with the vividness of music is that we simply hear emotional feelings in 
the musical form. 
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simulation is the only possible way to detect resemblances to bodily feelings, or to be aroused 
on the basis of musical listening. My argument will be that this mechanism can better reconcile 
our observations about musical arousal than alternate accounts. 
 
First we have to show that detecting expressive qualities plausibly involves recreation. This 
view has been previously defended by several authors (Bharucha, Curtis, and Paroo, 2006; 
Overy and Molnar-Szakacs, 2009; Cochrane, 2010). These authors appeal to various neural 
and physiological studies, but we don’t need sophisticated psychological experiments to know 
that when you pretend to have an emotion by acting out its characteristic behaviours (e.g. 
tensing your muscles, drooping your body) you can get a sense of what that emotion feels like. 
The difference that simulation theory adds is that one can imagine taking on the relevant bodily 
characteristics (guided by the music) and still get an attenuated sense of those feelings. 
 
One consideration in favour of simulation theory is evidence that when people become 
incapable of emotional arousal in a certain respect, they simultaneously lose the capacity to 
detect it in others (reviewed by Cochrane, 2010; Young, 2014, p. 60). Another consideration is 
phenomenological: to get a vivid sense of what an emotion is like—how it feels—plausibly 
involves being acquainted with that feeling at that particular moment. I think it’s also worth 
mentioning that if we build in Meyer’s theory of expectations into our account of musical 
expressivity, forming intuitive expectations about the development of bodily feelings likely 
also relies on the immediate sense of those bodily feelings. 
 
If a simulation is present, contagion can follow. Simulation theory generally distinguishes 
between ‘offline’ simulations of emotion and ‘online’ arousal (e.g. Goldman, 2006; Currie and 
Ravenscroft, 2002). The transition amounts to little more than endorsement of the offline 
simulation. But how does one non-metaphorically ‘endorse’ a simulated bodily feeling? The 
most straightforward answer is that one simply relaxes into the full-blooded arousal. That is, 
instead of holding oneself still, inhibiting the bodily tendencies that are being modelled in the 
motor cortex, one permits the bodily tendencies to manifest. One literally allows oneself to 
move along with the motor representation. Associative links are likely to be involved as well. 
We cannot usually deliberately activate responses like hormonal release, but such reactions 





Now an important point to make here is that the arousal of a bodily feeling is not yet an 
intentionally-directed emotional state. This is a point that Stephen Davies also emphasises in 
his contagion model, “the listener does not believe of sad music what would make it an 
appropriate emotional object of the sad response she experiences, namely, that there is 
something about the music that is unfortunate or regrettable” (2013, p. 172). It might become 
an emotion if say, the listener starts thinking about some sad-meriting situation. But if so, that 
listener falls foul of the formalist’s primary condition that the feeling must be properly directed 
at the music, and not extraneous distractions.  
 
Yet here is a vital point: there is really no need for the listener to build in extra associations to 
propositional contents. We already have everything we need to reconcile our observations 
about musical arousal. Contagious arousal on this model is really nothing more than an 
uninhibited way of engaging with the music itself. One’s feelings are entirely guided by one’s 
processing of resemblances between musical features and bodily feelings, combined with 
expectations about how the music is progressing (in line with expectations gained via the prior 
experience of emotional bodily feelings). The range of feelings this can stimulate is sufficient 
to explain the various subjective feelings of being moved by music. 
 
Note that my resemblance-expectation model can also accommodate the various physiological 
responses we observe. Replicating the bodily feeling of sadness can stimulate tears. 
Resemblance based expectations can also result in chills. Chills are most commonly aroused 
in response to music when the music shifts up a gear in intensity (Bicknell, 2009, Ch.3). 
Surprise is not necessary, because chills can be reliably induced with pieces that listeners know 
very well (Grewe, 2009). On the contrary, the better explanation for chills is that the body is 
physiologically accommodating an anticipated requirement for increased arousal intensity. 
Thus our enhanced resemblance-expectation model is handy for allowing that the resemblance 
to increasing bodily tension generates an expectation that intense action is forthcoming, and 
our bodies accordingly prepare for it. 
 
If one holds a fully somatic theory of emotions, then one may regard the stimulation of a pattern 
of bodily responses directed at the music as sufficient for an emotional state (e.g. Hufendiek, 
2016; Deonna and Teroni, 2012). I’m inclined to treat this more as a problem for those theories 
than a reason to say that musical arousal is a genuine emotional state. At best, it would be an 
irrational or illusory emotional state. This is because the music does not merit an emotion of 
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anger or sadness in the sense that some goal of the individual is being frustrated or something 
they care about lost. 
 
Other philosophers have claimed that music arouses moods, again in deference to the idea that 
instrumental music does not covey propositional contents (Roberts, 2003, pp. 120-132; Carroll, 
2003; Sizer, 2007). Given how (aptly) nebulous the concept of mood is, it may not commit us 
to very much to admit that music arouses moods. However, contemporary theories of moods 
often argue that they are about everything, or how one’s life is going in general (for an extensive 
review and defense see Mitchell, 2019). If that’s right, then to have a mood would again be 
discounted by formalists as another distracted state. 
 
The simpler theory is just that music arouses bodily feelings which, though they bear systematic 
connections with the bodily feelings we find in the garden variety emotional states, are not 
actually emotions. Instead, they are arousal states in which we appreciate the expressive 
contours of the music. Expressive qualities are aesthetic qualities. When done well, expressive 
qualities bear the traditional aesthetic virtues of unity, complexity and intensity (e.g. Beardsley, 
1958). They also display the exquisite sensitivity to particularities that are the hallmark of 
aesthetic properties (Sibley, 1959). Our musical arousal helps us to track these features. 
 
In other words, I believe the best thing to say about the musical arousal I have described here 
is that it forms the constitutive base of different kinds of appreciative states. That is, these states 
are more like pleasures than emotions. Bodily arousal can serve as the basis for enjoying the 
beauty of the music (the formal perfection of the feelings expressed), or the sublimity of the 
music (e.g. the powerful depiction of destructive feelings), its tragedy (the sympathetic 
depiction of what it’s like to suffer), its drama (the exciting clash or rush of different feelings), 
or even its comedy (e.g. an incongruous reversal of feelings).5 
 
Note also that my view may be embraced by formalists if they are motivated to deny garden 
variety emotions due to a background commitment to the Kantian account of aesthetic 
appreciation. If emotional arousal requires a belief in the reality of its target, emotions towards 
                                               
5 Jerrold Levinson develops a comparable position on musical chills. Although his account of how chills are 
triggered differs from mine, he claims that they “are usually the first sign that one has registered something of 
depth or significance in the music… [They] serve as focusers of attention, as direct aids to appreciation, drawing 
attention to expressive aspects of musical structure that might otherwise escape notice” (2006, p. 234). 
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music may conflict with disinterested pleasure, which is supposed to be pleasure independent 
of an interest in the existence of its object.6 Yet physiological or behavioural responses to music, 
even if directed at expressive contents, do not entail that one’s appreciation depend on one 
believing that those expressive contents are ‘real’ in the sense of there being a person actually 
undergoing that emotion.  
 
6. Best Explanations 
Kivy never showed much sympathy for contagion models of musical arousal. Yet my version 
takes on what I believe to be the core commitments of enhanced formalism, including its central 
aim of explaining how we appreciate aesthetic qualities. Furthermore, I believe that there is no 
alternate theory of musical arousal that can better accommodate the various conditions I 
outlined in section 2. 
 
Consider Kivy’s claim that feeling moved by the beauty of the music in all its varieties can be 
accommodated purely by appeal to the features of the music that we hear (1999, p. 9-10). 
There’s a clear problem with this. As it stands there is no distinction between perceiving the 
qualities of the music and feeling moved by the qualities of the music. It’s like saying that 
observing someone having an emotion is the same as having the emotion yourself, or seeing 
someone enjoying themselves is the same as enjoying yourself. 
 
Note that the musical case differs from the pure cognitive account of emotions, where what 
distinguishes one emotion from another is the specific situational appraisal. As Martha 
Nussbaum (2004) says, that appraisal has to be one of the personal importance of the situation 
(e.g. it’s her mother who has died, not yours!). The musical case lacks this sort of content. One 
of the most important features of aesthetic values is that they do not depend for their existence 
on their special relevance to the individual who detects them. That is, they are equally 
accessible to all sorts of people for the same reasons and to the same degree of intensity. 
 
So how about a more ordinary appraisal theory whereby we simply evaluate how well the music 
satisfies our concerns? In so far as I strongly desire to hear great music, a particular piece can 
stimulate all sorts of emotions by satisfying, disappointing or frustrating this desire. But note 
                                               
6 Though note that not all theories of emotion have this requirement (as discussions of the paradox of fiction attest) 
e.g. Robinson (2005); Todd (2012). 
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that the negative side of such emotions isn’t the target we are aiming at when we say we feel 
moved by the music. Feeling moved is by and large a positive appraisal, though sometimes 
bittersweet. To shed a tear when feeling moved is no indicator that the musicians have cruelly 
disappointed our expectations! Yet this is the only way we would expect tears under an ordinary 
appraisal model.  
 
Furthermore, appraisal-based emotions will not tend to track the precise qualities of the music. 
You can of course feel delighted by a particular musical phrase, but emotions about pieces of 
music tend towards appraisals of the piece as a whole. The question that every emotion asks is 
‘what is the relevance of this situation to my interests?’ I can change my mind about how I feel 
about something, but what the emotion seeks is a stable evaluation of an object, which then 
triggers a regulative response (i.e. to avoid or approach). As such, while appraisal-based 
emotions may accompany and amplify our musical arousal, they do not line up well with the 
physiological shifts that we observe as the music unfolds. They are also not intrinsic to the 
process of understanding the formal qualities of the work. They are rather an end product of 
having understood the work. 
 
What other theory of musical arousal is available? There’s Meyer’s original expectation-based 
theory. This has been developed in a very sophisticated way by David Huron (2006), who 
associates different emotional outcomes with different ways that expectations can develop. The 
expectation view is particularly good at accommodating chills, which is why I made use of it. 
However, it has trouble accommodating other sorts of feelings, such as being moved to tears, 
or the intense sense of power that sublime music stimulates. For such effects, one needs the 
resources of the contagion theory. 
 
In addition, the mechanic of expectation-satisfaction/violation has always had trouble 
explaining how repeated listens to the same piece can arouse the same feelings. When a piece 
becomes familiar, it cannot subvert our expectations in the way it did upon initial acquaintance. 
Or to put it another way: how is that two pieces with which we are extremely familiar can 
nevertheless arouse very different feelings? In both cases, our expectations equally line up with 
what we hear. Again, this is the reason why we first need the simulation of the bodily feeling 
(dictated by resemblances). Once we have this, we can then modulate the feeling according to 




Overall, I conclude that the resemblance-expectation model of musical arousal is the best 
explanation for the variations in feeling that we experience and observe while listening to music. 
Most importantly, it explains how our feelings are directed at the music itself, in a manner that 
plays an important role in understanding that piece of music. I have denied that this feeling is 
an emotional state. I do not even think it should be called an aesthetic emotion, at risk of 
confusing the essentially self-oriented nature of emotional appraisals with the objective or 
sharable nature of aesthetic evaluations. I do not deny that the kind of arousal I have described 
can easily tip over into a genuine emotional state, should the listener take wider matters into 
consideration. This is potentially the source of a number of psychological and social benefits. 
Yet the value of music does not rely on these instrumental benefits. The pleasures of music 
alone are sufficient. 
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